Part II of the article completes the discussion of the scope of section 93. It goes on to demonstrate the difficulties in the inter-relations of real evidence and documentary evidence.

Winding up proceedings have the potential to expose the company to ultimate dissolution. Thus, the issue of locus standi to petition the court for a winding up order assumes some importance. Under section 217()(a) of the Malaysian Companies Act 1965, the 'company' has standing to petition the court. However, under article 73 of Table A of the Act, the directors are delegated the management power. The question then arises as to whether the management power encompasses the power to petition the court for a winding up without a resolution of the members in general meeting. There appears to be a serious conflict of judicial opinion on the issue. This article traces the case law on the subject, focusing on the recent Malaysian case of Miharja Development Sdn Bhd & Ors v Tan Sri Datuk Loy Hean Heong & Ors and Another Application (1995) 4 MSCLC 91,285.

This article attempts to set out the law relating to marital rape, specific and little discussed form of violence against women. The historic basis and the contemporary arguments in favour of the spousal immunity will also be examined. Ultimately, however, it will be suggested that the immunity, archaic and inconsistent as it is with the status of women today, ought to abolished or at least substantially modified.

Section 300(c) of the Penal Code is the murder provision most frequently used by the prosecution and also the most problematic. Despite a diversity of academic and judicial views on its proper interpretation, there is a surprising consensus on the correctness of the Supreme Court of India's interpretation of that provision inVirsa Singh v. State of Punjab, which has become the locus classicus. This article respectfully submits that the Virsa Singh approach is wrong for contradicting the express statutory language in Illustration (b) to s. 300, failing to give effect to the ordinary meaning of the words in s. 300(c), and ignoring the important legal and historical context in which that provision was drafted. It argues for a new approach which restores the severity of the injury which the accused intended to inflict, regardless of whether it is the same as the injury actually inflicted, as the touchstone of the offence.

The definition of what constitutes a road is central to the whole scheme of compulsory insurance under the Motor Vehicles (Third-Party Risk and Compensation) Act. This is due to the fact that compulsory insurance against third party liability for personal injuries is imposed whenever a motor vehicle is "used". This concept of use is defined as "use on any road", and road is in turn defined as "any public road or any other road to which the public has access". This means that in order to understand the obligation imposed by the MVA, one has to understand the meaning of the word "road". Of particular interest is whether a carpark is a road for the purposes of the Act. This article looks at recent developments in the UK and compares the UK approach with that of Singapore courts.

Special Purpose Acquisition Companies, or SPACs, have become popular investment vehicles in 2020–2021. In response to this recent growth in popularity, regulators in Singapore and Hong Kong have introduced new listing rules permitting the listing of SPACs in their jurisdictions. In doing so, they have generally referred to the regulations and market practices in the US. These represent a set of norms which have been negotiated between regulators, SPAC managers and investors over decades of transactions. Regulators in Singapore and Hong Kong have innovated on these basic rules in response to recent criticisms of the SPAC structure and to accommodate local market factors and regulatory aims. This paper will examine how the regulators have, in the process of setting up SPAC markets locally, leveraged on the regulations and practices in the US as a starting point and how the consultation process allowed them to fine-tune their proposals.

This article is concerned with the remedies available for delay in the performance of contractual obligations, and in particular with the proper analysis of the question whether time is of the essence. The law in this area is both difficult and complex, not only with regard to whether is of the essence in any given case, but also with regard to what this entails. It is argued that many of the difficulties arise from the ambiguous and inconsistent way in which the courts have approached the question whether time is of the essence, the concept being used in several distinct, albeit related, sensed. The article seeks to demonstrate that the law relating to the topic is unnecessarily complicated, and to suggest ways in which it might be simplified.

The article considers the law governing the element of public benefit in charitable trusts established for the advancement of religion, with particular reference to trusts providing for the performance if religious rites in public. The recent English decision in Re Hetherington (deceased) [1989] 2 All E.R. 129 is considered in the light of the previous authorities and the judgment commented on. The impact which the case might have on the existing Singapore law in the field is evaluated, and the suggestion made that some judicial reappraisal of the previous Singaporean cases might now be appropriate.