This article argues that the tort of lawful act conspiracy is best understood, not as an economic tort, but as an instance of abuse of rights, and why it requires a test of malice.

This note argues that there is merit in having some notion of implies waiver of legal profession priviledge in terms of promoting fairness of trial and the interest of the administration of justice. Since the Evidence Act rules out the possibility of implied waiver, the desirable objectives of fairness of trial and finality of litigation may have to be achieved by recognising that an advocate has astensible authority to waive the priviledge (although express consent to waiver may be lacking)

In an earlier volume, I argued that state policies based on ethno-racial essentialism were undesirable and that accommodative liberalism provided a commendable alternative, enabling states to take seriously the need for ethnic groups to protect their cultural institutions and respective identities without resorting to essentialist assumptions. These arguments have since been subject to critical scrutiny by Lim Chin Leng in his essay, "Multicultural Constitutionalism." I respond to Lim's criticisms, arguing: (a) that accommodative liberalism takes group rights seriously and does not collapse into atomistic individualism; (b) that accommodative liberalism can protect group rights without resorting to essentialist assumptions; and (c) that despite its parochial origins in western political thought, accommodative liberalism dies have something to contribute to the wider debate about multicultural policy, even in Southeast Asia. Accommodative liberalism, I argue, represents a plausible attempt to construct a "big tent" - a flexible approach to pluralism and tolerance in diverse societies.

The two principal remedies in corporate law against abusive conduct toward minorities are the derivative action and the oppression action. The former allows a proper complainant to seek relief on behalf of the company while the latter provides non-controlling shareholders with various personal remedies where they establish oppressive conduct. The courts have recently proposed a distinction between an “essentially corporate wrong” (which members may purportedly only rectify under the derivative action) and a “personal wrong” (which is purportedly the only valid basis for the oppression action). It is suggested that focusing on the nature of the wrong is untenable given commercial realities that a wrong to a company can also readily prejudice members’ rights. Instead, the emphasis should be on the agreement or understanding of the parties and the specific reliefs being sought.

The story of "Personal Equities" in Singapore is a fascinating one. The first successful claim of a "personal equities" outside the statutory regime in Singapore surfaced some forty years after the introduction of the Torrens system in 1956. Subsequently, the "personal equities exception" was affirmed by one Court of Appeal and rejected by another. Since then, the Singapore courts have proceeded on the basis that there is a finite list of "personal equities" listed in section 46(2) of the Land Titles Act. This article proposes to explore these developments and demonstrate that the "personal equities exception" is in truth not an exception to indefeasibility. As a matter of statutory interpretation, such claims are simply not caught in the first place by the principle of indefeasibility as conferred by section 46(1) of the Land Titles Act. As such, potential "personal equities" claims ought not to be limited by section 46(2) exclusively.

This paper deals with copyright and moral rights issues in the works of Indian national poet, C Subramania Bharati. Its focus is on policy questions, touching on the protection of the artistic integrity of creative works, the democratization of access to literature, the possibility of perpetual moral rights protection in artistic works of exceptional national importance, and the appropriate role of moral rights in developing countries. The analysis will concentrate on Indian copyright law. It will also consider the impact of international copyright developments on the law in India, concluding with a brief critique of international principles in their application to developing countries.