The double actionability rule, which was first laid down in the 19th century, has been the subject of considerable academic and judicial criticism. Over the years, several jurisdictions around the world have abandoned the double actionability rule in favour of alternative choice of law rules for torts. Canada, in two landmark decisions, reconsidered its earlier jurisprudence on the applicable choice of law rules for torts, as well as multijurisdictional defamation cases in particular. However, the apex court in Singapore has unquestioningly adopted the double actionability rule as part of Singapore law in a series of cases starting in the 1990s. Unfortunately, the seeds of reform that were sown by the lower courts at various points in time have been largely ignored. This article argues that in the light of recent developments and changing circumstances, the time is now ripe for Singapore to follow the lead of Canada and many other jurisdictions in departing from the double actionability rule.

This article argues that the tort of lawful act conspiracy is best understood, not as an economic tort, but as an instance of abuse of rights, and why it requires a test of malice.

This note argues that there is merit in having some notion of implies waiver of legal profession priviledge in terms of promoting fairness of trial and the interest of the administration of justice. Since the Evidence Act rules out the possibility of implied waiver, the desirable objectives of fairness of trial and finality of litigation may have to be achieved by recognising that an advocate has astensible authority to waive the priviledge (although express consent to waiver may be lacking)

In an earlier volume, I argued that state policies based on ethno-racial essentialism were undesirable and that accommodative liberalism provided a commendable alternative, enabling states to take seriously the need for ethnic groups to protect their cultural institutions and respective identities without resorting to essentialist assumptions. These arguments have since been subject to critical scrutiny by Lim Chin Leng in his essay, "Multicultural Constitutionalism." I respond to Lim's criticisms, arguing: (a) that accommodative liberalism takes group rights seriously and does not collapse into atomistic individualism; (b) that accommodative liberalism can protect group rights without resorting to essentialist assumptions; and (c) that despite its parochial origins in western political thought, accommodative liberalism dies have something to contribute to the wider debate about multicultural policy, even in Southeast Asia. Accommodative liberalism, I argue, represents a plausible attempt to construct a "big tent" - a flexible approach to pluralism and tolerance in diverse societies.