It is true that the term "intellectual property" ("IP") may give to the uninitiated_x000D_ the impression that it refers to a homogenous or unified subject matter. It is also_x000D_ true that not too long ago, at most a couple of decades, the then-prevailing thought_x000D_ leadership in IP was that in order to promote trade and to create a level playing field,_x000D_ a gradual harmonisation of IP rights in the world by the incorporation of minimum_x000D_ standards into international trade agreements was both necessary and justifiable. It_x000D_ is further true that the IP protection regime, perceived as a unified body of law, has become an integral part of international trade negotiations and has never been more economically and politically important than the present day. Nevertheless, the quest for a "one size fits all" regime in the IP system has increasingly been subject to question particularly in light of the fact that IP comprises historically distinct regimes of patent, copyright and trade mark law which differ greatly in terms of historical origins, policy objectives, scope of protection as well as social and commercial impact; even as we acknowledge that the rationale for protection is based primarily on theories of utilitarian incentives. Considered from this perspective, diversity is thus an integral and unique trait of IP that must be constantly borne in mind as well as embraced as we navigate the plethora of issues in this complex area.

The historical surveys of common law legal theory provided by volumes 8 and 11 of_x000D_ Springer's multi-volume Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence_x000D_ have now been published in paperback, at a price which makes them more accessible_x000D_ to a wider readership. Michael Lobban takes us from the seventeenth century through_x000D_ to the dawn of the twentieth, and Gerald Postema surveys developments in the twentieth century. Significantly, the latter volume is well over double the length of the former, attesting to the explosion of theoretical reflection in the common law world over the last century. Postema mentions (at p xxv) that the book took him ten years to write and even in that period the pace of change was such that received ideas became a moving target.

Jaclyn Neo's edited volume Constitutional Interpretation in Singapore—Theory and Practice is nicely situated at the confluence of two themes that are du jour in the constitutional law discourse: the methodological turn towards more empiricism and an academic infatuation with determining the proper role of courts within the system.

Over several centuries, the rhetoric of 'gap filling' has often been invoked to naturalise_x000D_ expansions of intellectual property ("IP") rights—copyright term extension,_x000D_ the patenting of life forms, trademark disparagement, and so forth. The ready pragmatism_x000D_ of the phrase has definite audience appeal, making big changes sound like_x000D_ straightforward responses to external conditions—rather than choices about how to_x000D_ draw the line between private ownership and public discourse. We know, however,_x000D_ that once filled, 'gaps' tend to stay filled. Retrospective debates about the wisdom of_x000D_ such decisions tend to be (both literally and figuratively) of merely academic interest._x000D_ So what is most refreshing and commendable about Professor Tan's The Commercial Appropriation of Fame is that the author's thorough and clear-eyed review of one such gap-filling project is powerful and timely enough that it could make a practical difference. Professor Tan not only tells us all we need to know about the historical origins of legal protection for celebrity personas, but also suggests a way that the scope of such protection can be reasonably cabined, in ways that largely fulfil the public interest in access to information, in years to come. This is all the more true because in the United States ("US") (with which Professor Tan is largely concerned), and elsewhere, the right of publicity and its cognates are largely creatures of the courts—common law improvisations which (even where they have received statutory confirmation) are still widely open to judicial interpretation.