The notion of public interest in sentencing conjures up images of utilitarian consequentialism and the emergence in Singapore of a role for public interests analysis in sentencing may create a superficial impression of judicial hardening and the beginnings of a new and repressive law and order ideology. This article demonstrates that the impression is not only superficial but also false. Its central argument is that public interests analysis is or has the potential to contribute clarity and add value to desert-based sentencing and that taken together with judicial benchmarking, which it complements, reflects a model of desert, which is neither deontological nor empirical. Nevertheless, the resultant model is not necessarily inferior to either.

Singapore has never adopted a laissez faire approach towards free speech, which is constitutionally entrenched in article 14 of the Singapore Constitution. Indeed, free speech is a means to various ends; its rationale is grounded in the arguments from truth, self-expression and democracy, which views political speech as the lifeblood of democratic societies. The official government view has been that an excessive focus on political liberties is destabilizing and inimical to economic growth and communitarian ‘Asian values’. Nonetheless, government policy has undergone a minor sea-change in loosening restrictions on political liberties to accommodate the demands of a more educated, affluent citizenry for greater participation in public affairs. This article focuses on two questions. First, what is the evolving government approach towards regulating political speech in the real and virtual realm. There has been a shift from ‘blanket bans’ to a more calibrated approach towards managing free speech issues. Second, what insight does the scope of free speech shed in relation to the type of political community we are, how we value political speech and other social goods. It evaluates law and policy which regulates political speech, as well as judicial approaches towards construing article 14 issues. It offers an in-depth analysis of the only public law case concerning speech in cyberspace, in relation to racist blogs. In particular, it analyses how political digital speech can both promote and undermine democracy in Singapore, measured against the central role free speech plays in promoting truth and solidifying a democratic order.

It is evident in current legal literature that the potentially vital role played by grandparents in the lives of children affected by parental divorce is not given serious consideration in court decisions on the custody, care and control of children since parents are recognized as the only persons with parental authority. The law is slow to intervene with the natural authority accorded to parents over their child. A central issue in this article is this: what place should grandparents occupy when a child is undergoing the trauma of parental divorce? In particular, when a judge adjudicates or conducts mediation in a case where two parents are seeking care and control of a child, should he or she also have regard to, or even seek out more information on the support that the grandparents can give to the child? We present a three-fold argument in this article: (a) the grandparent's role does not inevitably interfere with the rights of natural parents protected by the common law; (b) grandparents can contribute significantly to the well-being of the child when parents face serious crises and/or are unable to perform their normal role obligations; and (c) the court should take on a more inquisitorial role in cases involving children of divorced parents and have regard to the presence of grandparents in determining what is the welfare of the child. We discuss this three-fold argument in the light of findings from studies in several countries with particular attention to the situation in Singapore.

Articles 14 and 15 of the Singapore Constitution enshrine the rights to free speech, religious freedom, and other related rights in Singapore. These provisions also set out the circumstances under which these rights may be restricted. Notably, however, these provisions are directed at legislative restrictions. The question is how they are applicable to executive action. This paper suggests that there are two possible means by which one can assess the constitutionality of executive action under Articles 14 and 15 in Singapore - the jurisdictional and substantive approaches - and demonstrates that evidence of both approaches can be found in Singapore law. Drawing upon constitutional theory, the paper argues that the theoretical foundation for legal doctrine in this regard ought to be a combination of both the jurisdictional and substantive approaches, and also discusses the doctrinal test by which challenges to executive action under Articles 14 and 15 should be assessed.

Limited access to bank branches excludes over one billion people from accessing financial services in developing countries. Digital financial services offered by banks and mobile money providers through agents can solve this problem without the need for complex and costly physical banking infrastructures. Delivering digital financial services through agents requires a legal framework to regulate liability. This article analyses whether vicarious liability of the principal is a more efficient regulatory approach than personal liability of the agent. Agent liability in Kenya, Fiji, and Malawi is analysed to demonstrate that vicarious liability of the principal, coupled to an explicit agreement as to agent rewards and penalties, is the more efficient regulatory approach.