Artificial intelligence (“AI”) has garnered much attention in recent years, with capabilities spanning the operation of self-driving cars to the emulation of the great artistic masters of old. The field has now been ostensibly enlarged in light of the professed abilities of AI machines to autonomously generate patentable inventions. This article examines the present state of AI technology and the suitability of existing patent law frameworks in accommodating it. Looking ahead, the authors also offer two recommendations in a bid to anticipate and resolve the challenges that future developments in AI technology might pose to patent law. In particular, the case is made for fully autonomous machine inventors to be recognised as “inventors” by statute and for patent ownership of AI-generated inventions to be granted to the owners of these machine inventors by default.

The Study of Singaporean cases on diminished responsibility reveals that our judges have generally dealt with the elements of the defence in a haphazard manner. Furthermore, they have placed too much reliance on medical expert opinion. The submission is made that a close adherence to the model formulated by the English case of R v Byrne for determining diminished responsibility cases will considerably improve the judicial handling of such cases in our jurisdiction

In BOM v BOK, the Singapore Court of Appeal settled a three-pronged test for unconscionable transactions: (1) plaintiff "infirmity", (2) defendant "exploitation" of plaintiff infirmity, and (3) evidential burden on defendant to show the challenged transaction to be "fair, just and reasonable". This formulation is intended to represent a "middle-ground" doctrine of unconscionability, in the sense that it is broader than the original "narrow doctrine" of unconscionability from such cases as Fry v Lane and Cresswell v Potter in England, but "much narrower" than the "broad doctrine" of unconscionability in such cases as Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio in Australia. The Court rejected for Singapore the so-called "broad doctrine" on the ground that it is too unruly to function as a legal doctrine. To the extent that the Court saw the Amadio formulation as representing the spurned "broad doctrine", this article is an attempt to defend that formulation against a charge of hopeless uncertainty. In significant respects, it is argued, the Court's "middle-ground" doctrine is itself potentially broader than the Amadio-style approach to unconscionability.

In this article I adopt a comparative law approach to illustrate the coexistence of various models governing the sale of goods, and their classification on the basis of two main characteristics: the transfer of property and the opposition certainty/flexibility. I use this approach to analyse the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods.1 Then I examine how the CISG influenced several national systems and can influence future attempts at regional harmonisation. I conclude with the reasons that in my opinion make the CISG a good model for the sale of goods (prestige, equilibrium and derogability), and with the desirable future developments.

This article contains a comparative study of the use of the doctrine of common intention to secure the conviction of joint offenders for murder where an homicide is committed in furtherance of their common intention. The cases appear to be in conflict but the conflicts can be explained on the basis of the policy objectives courts seek to achieve.

The Privy Council's decision in Haw Tua Tau v PP restated the burden of proof at the close of the prosecution's case from that enunciated previously in the Singapore and Malaysian Courts and, in so doing, created a controversy which has not yet been put to rest even after the recent decision of the Singapore Court Of Criminal Appeal in Abdul Ghani v PP. This article attempts to discuss the inherent problems in these cases and the difficulties faced by the judge, counsel and accused at the close of the prosecution case.