In 1994, a difference of opinion arose between the President and the Government on whether the President had the power, under Article 22H(1) of the Constitution, to veto a Bill to amend Article 22H(1). The Constitution was amended to establish a Tribunal to which any question as to the effect of a constitutional provision on any Bill could be referred for its opinion. In the first reference heard on 17 March 1995, the Tribunal advised that the President had no power under Article 22H(1) to veto a Bill to amend Article 22H(1) itself. The Tribunal's position as well as the case for the Government was strongly criticized in an article published in the December 1995 issue of this journal. This article is a reply to those criticisms.

This article examines the source, nature and scope of the inherent powers of the court, as well as the relationship between these powers and the court's procedural mechanism. It has often been the view that the inherent jurisdiction of the English court is applicable in Singapore without qualification. This assumption must be considered in the light of the jurisdictional developments which have occurred since the 1960's. The article also focuses on the willingness of the court to use its inherent powers to ensure a fair and effective process of litigation, and the justification of such a role in the absence, or even in the face, of statutory provision.

Fiduciary law now covers a wide range of situations, in the commercial as well as the property areas, that are far removed from its origin in the law of express trusteeship. It is feared for its uncertainty of application, which is in part due to the generalizations in which the law that governs conflict of duty and interest on the part of trustees is couched. A different approach is needed for the variety of fiduciaries which exist in the modern law. It is necessary that the response of fiduciary law to situations which it is dealing with must be proportionate. It will also be suggested that the parties are able to regulate and limit their obligations under it through the law of contract.

This article explores some of the changes that the 4th Industrial Revolution brings to our understanding of money. Our analysis does not suggest that the only valid form of money is that provided or backed by the state.We rather argue that it is unlikely that money-like means of payment will prove sustainable in the long-term if not perceived as being vested with some form of legality. Still, mere legality will not prove to be sufficient for the new payment instruments to qualify as money. They must also prove to be able to serve as means of exchange/payment. A sharp reduction in value will diminish the credibility of the payment promise and thus user confidence/trust. Like acceptance of payment on sight, the use of money as a common measure of value is one of the most important properties of fiat (and metallic) money. Retention of value in times of stress is fundamental as regards the new assets' ability to act as a measure of value and its ability to fit with common perceptions of money. The requisite enquiry should be based on empirical studies of the intertemporal behaviour of the instrument. We suggest that fiat money aside, instruments that could eventually qualify as_x000D_ “money" ought to pass the dual test of legality and relative retention of value. This approach does not suggest a return to the metallic rule, which would limit free circulation of money. It is rather a pragmatic reformulation of the characteristics that means of payment, which do not enjoy the backing (will) of the state, must exhibit to enjoy quasi-money or money-like status. Assets that display high volatility are, thus, unlikely to fulfil the functions of “money" and should instead be dealt under the law of investments if they qualify as such.

As comparative lawyer Otto Kahn-Freund observed in the mid-1970s, there is a "far reaching free trade in legal ideas. Far reaching, not all embracing". We see this manifested in the law of privacy, whether understood in the traditional sense of freedom from intrusion into private life or some more extended sense of, for instance, control over personal information or physical or sensory integrity stretching beyond the enjoyment of an intimate interior private life. On the one hand, there is a great deal of cross-fertilisation across jurisdictions as elements of the law of one are copied in others, allowing certain broad groupings to evolve. On the other hand, there are still many differences between and within these groupings which may be partly due to the different legal contexts of the laws, but are also partly due to factors having to do with different social-cultural histories and norms, as well as different political environments within which laws are developed, interpreted, and enforced. These tensions have ongoing implications for the protection of privacy in the digital century. Yet there are hopeful signs of the possibility of convergence around legal standards of privacy protection in the future, as in the present and past—for all the legal, social-cultural and political differences that remain and for all the new challenges to privacy that we can expect to see.

Section 4(1)( c ) of the Singapore Trustees Act gives trustees the power to invest in land, as does the corresponding provision of the Malaysian Trustee Act. However, the power is subject to restrictions and, although it has existed for over fifty years, there are no reported cases on it. This article reviews the restrictions on the trustees' powers to invest in land in the light of the legislative history of the provision and concludes with a recommendation for reform of the law.