In VTL v VTM [2021] SGHCF 30 ("VTL v VTM"), the Singapore High Court had the opportunity to consider the application of the rarely-invoked mutual wills doctrine. The court gave effect to the mutual wills by holding that a subsequent will was invalid and revoking the grant of probate that had been obtained by the executors of that subsequent will. The court in so doing departed from the orthodox understanding that a mutual will takes effect by imposing a constructive trust over the relevant property, rather than by rendering a subsequent will invalid. This comment reviews the law on mutual wills in Singapore and elsewhere, and suggests that VTL v VTM was a missed opportunity to unpack some of the thorny issues that have yet to be resolved in relation to the doctrine.

The recent U.K. Supreme Court decision in Marley v. Rawlings, concerning the rectification of a will pursuant to English legislation, raises two points of reflection for Singapore law. These points arise not from the ratio of the case, which was decided on a narrow legislative basis, but from the well-considered obiter dicta contained in Lord Neuberger's judgment.

This Note discusses the application for judicial review initiated by the Sabah Law Society in respect of special grant reviews and payments between the Federation of Malaysia and the State of Sabah under Articles 112C and 112D of the Malaysian Federal Constitution. It is argued that the Malaysian High Court in granting leave to commence judicial review proceedings, and the Court of Appeal in upholding the High Court’s decision, ought to have considered whether the rights of the State of Sabah could be enforced by the Sabah Law Society in judicial review proceedings before the High Court. The Note concludes that any dispute on the special grant ought to be resolved in proceedings between the Federation and the State concerned and falls within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Malaysian Federal Court.

Wee Teng Yau represents the first case on tax avoidance by professionals to come before the Supreme Court. This note attempts to reconcile the judgments of the High Court and the Income Tax Board of Review, which both made findings that the taxpayer had engaged in tax avoidance, but which approached the case rather differently on some points. Apart from a clear rejection of the "personal exertion" principle as having no legal basis under Singapore law, it appears that the common conclusion is that professionals incorporating a company would not constitute tax avoidance in itself, but if this was coupled with the paying of an artificially low level of remuneration to the same practicing professional, this might well constitute tax avoidance.