This Note discusses the application for judicial review initiated by the Sabah Law Society in respect of special grant reviews and payments between the Federation of Malaysia and the State of Sabah under Articles 112C and 112D of the Malaysian Federal Constitution. It is argued that the Malaysian High Court in granting leave to commence judicial review proceedings, and the Court of Appeal in upholding the High Court’s decision, ought to have considered whether the rights of the State of Sabah could be enforced by the Sabah Law Society in judicial review proceedings before the High Court. The Note concludes that any dispute on the special grant ought to be resolved in proceedings between the Federation and the State concerned and falls within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Malaysian Federal Court.

Wee Teng Yau represents the first case on tax avoidance by professionals to come before the Supreme Court. This note attempts to reconcile the judgments of the High Court and the Income Tax Board of Review, which both made findings that the taxpayer had engaged in tax avoidance, but which approached the case rather differently on some points. Apart from a clear rejection of the "personal exertion" principle as having no legal basis under Singapore law, it appears that the common conclusion is that professionals incorporating a company would not constitute tax avoidance in itself, but if this was coupled with the paying of an artificially low level of remuneration to the same practicing professional, this might well constitute tax avoidance.

In Charles Lim v Hong Choon Hau [2021] SGCA 43, the Singapore Court of Appeal delivered an important judgment on no-oral-variation clauses, and their legal effect. This note analyses the reasoning of the Court, addressing also some implications the case might have on future developments.

In the case of Statoil A.S.A. v. Louis Dreyfus Energy Services L.P., Aikens J. has reasserted the traditional principles of English lawgoverning unilateral mistake. On one level, it is an unexceptional decision. It applies the well-settled law relating to unilateral mistake, based on long-established authority and as a reflection of the approach taken recently by the Court of Appeal to the significance of mistake in contract. On the other hand, the issues raised by the case prompt a re-examination of the approach of English law to unilateral mistake.

Sometimes, following a conviction, an appeal is brought by the convicted person without any crossappeal by the Prosecution on the sentence. Can the appellate court nevertheless increase the sentence imposed below? This study of the relevant cases and statutory provisions in Singapore suggests that both the High Court and the Court of Appeal are vested with the power to increase the sentence even where the only appeal is brought by the convicted person.